Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They are and Why They Matter by Koehler, Jonathan J.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 59 | Issue 5 Article 5
1-2008
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests:
What They are and Why They Matter
Jonathan J. Koehler
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They are and Why They Matter, 59 Hastings L.J. 1077 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol59/iss5/5
Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests:
What They Are and Why They Matter
JONATHAN J. KOEHLER*
INTRODUCTION
When a fingerprint examiner declares a match between a print from
a known source and a latent print recovered from a crime scene,' his
word may seal a defendant's fate like no other form of evidence save,
perhaps, DNA. At trial the fingerprint examiner will offer little in the
way of data, statistical tests, or uncertainty. Instead, he will say that
latent print could only have been made by the source of the known print,
that he is ioo% certain, that he has never erred, and that the method he
used to make this and other identifications has an error rate of zero.' In
recent years, the broader scientific community has objected to this form
of testimony. Critics charge that fingerprint analysis lacks an empirical
foundation and that examiners make exaggerated claims that are likely
to mislead jurors.
3
Regardless of one's views about the scientific underpinnings of
fingerprint examination, all agree that jurors need to understand the
* Professor of Law and Professor of Business, Arizona State University; Ph.D., University of
Chicago, 1989. I would like to thank Simon Cole, Robyn Dawes, and Michele Triplett for insightful
comments and suggestions.
I. A latent is a print of unknown source that is recovered from a crime scene.
2. See, e.g., State v. Rose, Case No. Ko6-o 5 45 , at 25 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007) (order granting
motion to exclude testimony) ("Mr. Meagher has stated that the FBI testifies to 'a too percent
certainty that we have an identification.'... Mr. Meagher claimed that there is no error rate for ACE-
V [the fingerprint technique]."); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF
THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANOON MAYFIELD CASE 8 (20o6) ("Latent fingerprint identifications are
subject to a standard of 1oo percent certainty.").
3. Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in Criminal Jury
Trials, 31 AM. J. CRiM. L. 1, 65 (2003) ("[Flingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of
study done on the accuracy of the examiners coupled with the unwillingness or inability of the forensic
science community to detect, acknowledge, and correct mistakes."); Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J.
Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 894 (2005)
[hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Paradigm Shift]; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The
Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 214-15 (2OO8)
[hereinafter Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy]; Adina Schwartz, Commentary on Nichols, 52
J. FOREN. SCIS. 1414, 1414-15 (2007).
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probative value of fingerprint evidence at trial.4 Drawing on research by
decision theorist David Schum, researchers at U.C. Irvine explain that
probative value is a combination of the diagnosticity and reliability of a
reported match.' The diagnosticity of a reported fingerprint match is the
value of shared characteristics for establishing that two prints share a
common source.6 If prints from many different fingers share the observed
characteristics, then the match report will be correspondingly less
diagnostic of the claim that the two prints share a common source. If the
observed characteristics are rare, then the match report will be more
diagnostic of the common source claim.7 The reliability of a reported
fingerprint match pertains to whether two reportedly matching prints
actually do share a common set of characteristics.' That is, is the reported
match a true match, or has the examiner made an error? Taken together,
the diagnosticity and reliability of a reported match provide rational
jurors with the information they need to assess the probative value of a
fingerprint examiner's opinion that two prints share a common source.
The sad truth is that there is a dearth of good data that directly
pertains to either diagnosticity or reliability. On the diagnosticity side,
the fingerprinting profession has made remarkably few attempts to test
its uniqueness assumptions or to develop an empirical foundation from
which to offer probabilistic claims.9 We simply do not know the
frequency with which various characteristics relied on by fingerprint
examiners exist in various populations.
More important, however, is the risk that an examiner has erred,
thereby implicating reliability. An examiner is unreliable if he frequently
or perhaps even occasionally concludes that: (a) prints made from
different sources were made by a common source, or (b) prints made
from common sources were made by different sources. In its landmark
4. The evidence is best characterized as a "reported match" rather than a "match" because the
former description captures the uncertainty associated with the possibility that an examiner mistakenly
failed to notice differences between two prints that should have produced a conclusion that the two
prints do not match. See Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence:
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859, 870 (1996) ("The major
difference between treating DNA evidence as a certain match and treating DNA evidence as a
reported match is that only the latter requires consideration and explicit incorporation of the
possibility of error.").
5. Suzanne 0. Kaasa et al., Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead
Match, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 434 (2007).
6. Id.
7. In DNA testing, the random match probability (RMP) captures the diagnosticity of a match
report. The RMP is the frequency with which a genetic profile (i.e., the relevant set of alleles) exists in
a reference population. William C. Thompson & Simon A. Cole, Psychological Aspects of Forensic
Identification Evidence, in EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 31, 34 (Mark Costanzo,
Daniel Krauss & Kathy Pezdek eds., 2oo7).
8. Kaasa et al., supra note 5.
9. Saks & Koehler, Paradigm Shift, supra note 3; Saks & Koehler, Individualization Fallacy,
supra note 3.
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Daubert and Kumho" decisions, the Supreme Court stated that trial
courts "ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error"
when evaluating the reliability of scientific techniques and other forms of
expert testimony.'2 Though the Supreme Court did not require trial
courts to seek error rates, fingerprint examination is surely the poster
child for the centrality of this Daubert factor. Without information about
error rates, fact finders have an insufficient basis for assessing the
examiner's reliability and assigning weight to his opinion.
Though sufficient data on the diagnosticity and reliability of
fingerprint match reports do not exist, there is reason to expect that their
diagnosticity will generally be high and that their reliability (as given by
rates of error) will be substantially lower.'3 If so, then the issue of error
rate is even more important because the probative value of the reported
fingerprint match is restricted by the chance that a false positive error
has occurred.'4 In other words, if experts make false positive errors, say,
one time in 200, then it does not matter whether the chance that two
randomly selected prints match is one in a million, billion, or trillion. It
does not even matter whether the chance of a coincidental match is zero
(as implausible and unscientific as this value is) because in these
situations, the false positive error rate limits and controls the probative
value of the match report.5 The relevance of this observation for our
so. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (I993).
i i. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
12. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 (interpreting Daubert to apply not only to "'scientific' testimony,
but to all expert testimony"); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
13. On the diagnosticity side, the chance of a coincidental DNA match is often extremely small
(e.g., one in many millions, billions, or trillions). On the reliability side, the chance of a false match
that arises from, say, a sample handling mistake is much larger. If fingerprint coincidental match
probabilities also turn out to be quite remote, then the rate at which false matches due to lab errors
will probably be much larger.
14. False positive errors are defined infra.
15. A similar point has been made many times in the context of reported DNA matches. See, e.g.,
DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES 35 (2005) ("If the false-match
probability (ii) is judged to be much larger than the chance-match probability (i), then the latter
probability is effectively irrelevant to evidential weight [and] it is not the absolute but the relative
magnitude of the false-match to the chance-match probabilities that determines whether the former
can be safely neglected."); Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA
Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JuIMETRICS J. 201, 201 (1995) ("[Random Match
Probabilities (RMPs)] contribute little to an assessment of the diagnostic significance of a reported
DNA match beyond that given by the false positive laboratory error rate when RMPs are several
orders of magnitude smaller than this error rate."); Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars:
Skirmishing with NRC 11, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 439, 447 (I997) ("[T]he probative value of a DNA match is
always limited by the chance of false positive error."); William C. Thompson et al., How the
Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC ScIs. 47, 47 (203)
("[Hiaving accurate estimates [of] the false positive probabilities can be crucial for assessing the value
of DNA evidence."); see also Steve Gutowski, Error Rates in the Identification Sciences, FORENSIC
BULL., Summer 2005, at 23 ("An estimate of actual or potential error rate is crucial to the probative
value of all evidence.").
1079
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
purposes here is to note that error rate is so central to an assessment of
the reliability and probative value of fingerprint evidence that it is not
sufficient to know, simply, that errors might occur or that errors have
occurred. Instead, judges who make admissibility decisions and jurors
who assess the probative value of fingerprint evidence need to have
better information on the risk that an error has occurred in the instant
case.
Does scientific data related to the risk of error exist? If not, how
shall we go about getting those data? There is much confusion
surrounding these questions. In this Article, I use a question and answer
style to address key issues related to fingerprint error rates and the
proficiency tests that are sometimes used to estimate those rates. My
focus throughout is on how to assess the various error rates, why they
matter, and how we might go about collecting the requisite data. I do not
examine individual cases of error, incompetence or fraud; this
information can be found elsewhere.'6 In Part I, I identify the different
types of errors and error rates and explain why knowledge of error rates
is important. In Part II, I discuss the connection between proficiency tests
and estimated error rates. In Part III, I identify the features proficiency
tests must include to ensure that the resultant data can help estimate
casework error rates.
I. ERRORS AND ERROR RATES
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ERROR IN FINGERPRINT EXAMINATION?
There is no agreed-upon answer to what counts as an error. Obvious
errors occur when an examiner either matches a print to a person other
than the one who made it or affirmatively excludes the true source of a
print. Less obviously, some would argue that an examiner who correctly
identifies the source of a print but incorrectly identifies the finger that
produced it has made an error. Others would argue that such an error is
so inconsequential relative to other types of errors that it does not
deserve the "error" label.
Similarly, when an examiner offers an "inconclusive" opinion about
whether two prints match, there is a sense in which he has erred. After
all, he did not get the answer right, and the consequences of this failure
may be serious (e.g., missed opportunity to exonerate a suspect).
However, in the more usual sense of the meaning of error, an
i6. For reviews of fingerprint errors, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENrmES: A HISTORY OF
FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2O01), and Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and
Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 39, 57-
60 (2oo6). For a review of sloppy laboratory procedures and fraud see, e.g., Paul Giannelli, The Abuse
of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & LAW 439 (1997).
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inconclusive is not an error. It is a pass. An inconclusive means that the
examiner offers no judgment about whether two prints do or do not
share a common source. Therefore, for purpose of computing the errors
and error rates (see below), I set inconclusives aside.
B. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ERRORS?
Table I below offers a visual aid that helps clarify the different types
of errors. Table I crosses the two states of nature pertaining to a pair of
fingerprints (S = same source, -S = different source) with the two types
of decisions that fingerprint examiners offer for their relation ("S" = says
common source, "-S" = says different source). The four aggregate states
described in cells A to D are mutually exclusive (non-overlapping) and
exhaustive (all situations described). Cells A and B represent states
where the examiner reports that two prints share a common source. Cells
C and D represent states where the examiner reports that two prints
were left by different sources.
TABLE I: STATES OF NATURE AND EXAMINER'S JUDGMENT
EXAMINER'S STATES OF NATURE (I.E., TRUTH)
JUDGMENT SAME SOURCE (S) DIFFERENT SOURCE (-S)
COMMON A B
SOURCE ("S") True Positives False Positives
DIFFERENT C D
SOURCE ("-S") False Negatives True Negatives
Two important types of errors are false positive errors and false
negative errors. A false positive error occurs when an examiner concludes
that two prints share a common source when, in fact, they do not. This
error is captured by judgments in cell B. A false negative error occurs
when an examiner concludes that two prints do not share a common
source when, in fact, they do. This error is captured by judgments in cell
C.
C. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ERROR RATES?
Three error rates are of central importance: the false positive error
rate, the false negative error rate and the false discovery rate. None of
these error rates lay claim to being "the" error rate because the term
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error rate has been used in different ways.'7
The false positive error rate identifies the rate at which an examiner
concludes that two prints share a common source when, in fact, they do
not. It is computed by dividing the number of false positive errors by the
number of examined pairs of prints that are from different sources. In
terms of the cells in Table I, the false positive error rate
B
("S" I-S) = B
The false negative error rate is the rate at which an examiner concludes
that two prints do not share a common source when, in fact, they do. It is
computed by dividing the number of false negative errors by the number
of examined pairs of prints that are from common sources. In terms of
the cells in Table I, the false negative error rate
C
P ( " S I S ) = CA+C
The false discovery is identifies the rate at which an examiner's claim
that two markings share a common source is wrong.'8 It is computed by
dividing the number of false positive errors by the number of examined
pairs of prints that the examiner judged to share a common source. In
terms of the cells in Table I, the false discovery rate
P(-S I "S") 
B
A+B
The false discovery rate is the inverse of the false positive error rate.
Whereas the false positive error rate is P("S" I -S), the false discovery
rate is P(-S I "S"). Both are error rates and both provide important
17. IRVING B. WEINER ET AL., HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 552 ("In scientific writing and
research, error rate has no uniform definition.").
I8. There is no widely agreed-upon terminology for describing this particular error rate. In using
the term "false discovery rate," to describe P(-S I "S"), I follow the recent statistics literature. See
Yoav Benjamin & Yosef Hochberg, Controlling the False Discovery Rate: A Practical and Powerful
Approach to Multiple Testing, 57 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y 289, 291 (I995) (the false discovery rate is "the
proportion of the rejected null hypotheses which are erroneously rejected). The epidemiological
literature, which spawned the terms "false positive" and "false negative," does not identify this error
rate (which is computationally identical to "one minus the positive predictive value"). Others have
referred to it as the "percent false positives." See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 79 (1981); Stephen D. Hart et al., A
Note on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697 (0993).
However, "percent false positives" may be confused with its inverse, the "false positive error rate."
Ther term "false alarm rate" would seem to describe this error, but this phrase is often used it as a
synonym for the false positive error rate. Terminological ambiguities are yet another reason why there
is confusion over the meaning of error rate.
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information for assessing the accuracy of fingerprint examiners.
It is important to reiterate that there are other ways to report error
rates' 9 and that there are even different ways to report the false positive
error rate.20 However, in the interests of simplicity and clarity, I limit the
discussion of error rates to the central notions mentioned here.
D. WHICH ERROR RATE IS MORE USEFUL: THE FALSE DISCOVERY RATE OR
THE FALSE POSITIVE ERROR RATE?
There is no easy answer. All error rates are useful, but each has its
own unique features and limitations that legal actors must understand.
The false discovery rate is probably what decision makers most want
to know and what they assume that an error rate tells them: how often is
the examiner wrong when he calls a match?" The central problem with
false discovery rate is that it varies as a function of the baserate chance
that an unknown latent print and known prints handled by the examiner
share a common source. Figure I illustrates the point. Suppose that two
equally skilled fingerprint examiners each have a 5% false positive error
rate, and a 5% false negative error rate.2 If the first examiner reviews
i,ooo pairs of prints, 9oo of which share a common source, his false
discovery rate will be (on average) 5 out of 86o or o.6%. In other words,
when this examiner concludes that two prints share a common source, he
is wrong less than i % of the time.
Now suppose that the second examiner reviews i,ooo pairs of prints,
in which only ioo pairs share a common source. This examiner's false
discovery rate will be (on average) 45 out of 140 or 32%! Is the second
examiner worse than the first? No. They are identical in terms of their
skill level as evidenced by their identical false positive and false negative
error rates. However, the second examiner makes more mistakes because
he is subjected to a tougher task.23 The point is that when the false
19. Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, Questions About Forensic Science: Response, 311
SCIENCE 6o7, 6o9 (2oo6) (pointing out four different ways to compute the error rate in a hair
comparison study).
20. Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1030 (2005) ("There are a number of different ways of reporting false
positives. Often the false positive rate has been reported as the number of participants who committed
at least one false positive divided by the total number of participants."); William C. Thompson,
Subjective Interpretation, Laboratory Error and the Value of Forensic DNA Evidence: Three Case
Studies, 96 GENETICA 153, 155 (995) ("The false positive rate of a test is most usefully stated as the
ratio of false positives to the sum of true positives and false positives." (citation omitted)).
Thompson's definition of the most useful form of the false positive error rate is identical to the "false
discovery rate." Id.
21. Lempert, supra note 15, at 449 ("[Tihe jury wants to know, given that a match has been
reported, how likely is it that it is false.").
22. For simplicity, ignore the rate of inconclusive judgments, which we will assume to be similar
for the two examiners.
23. The task is tougher for the second examiner because the match baserate is lower (too out of
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
discovery rate is available, special attention should be paid to the
mapping between the baserate chance that pairs of prints share a
common source in the target case versus in the task (usually a test or
series of tests) that generated the false discovery rate. If these chances
are similar, then the false discovery rate provides a simple, direct
measure of a key error rate in the instant case. If not, then the false
discovery rate should be adjusted to account for the difference in
chances.
I,ooo = 1o% for the second examiner versus goo out of i,ooo = 9o% for the first examiner).
[Vol. 59:1077
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FIGURE I: EFFECT OF BASERATES ON THE FALSE DISCOVERY RATE
FALSE POS ERROR RATE = 5%
FALSE NEG ERROR RATE = 5 %
i,ooo Sample Pairs
Common Source Different Source
900 100
85 45 5 95
P (Different Source / Examiner Says "Common Source") -
5 _ 5 = o.6%
855 + 5 86o
FALSE POS ERROR RATE 5 %
FALSE NEG ERROR RATE =5%
i,ooo Sample
Pairs
Common Source Different Source
100 900
95 5 4585
P (Different Source / Examiner Says "Common Source") =
45 = 32.1%
95 + 45 140
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The false positive error rate does not rely on an assumption about
the rate at which prints handled by an examiner share a common
source.24 This is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because
the mapping issue described above does not threaten the applicability of
the statistic to the target case. It is a weakness because the implications of
this statistic depend on the baserate chance that latent and known prints
in the target case share a common source. In short, there is no getting
around the problem of baserate match chance when it comes to applying
error rates to individual cases. Either that baserate is built into the
statistic as it is for the false discovery rate, or a case-specific baserate
must be combined with the "purer" false positive error rate to determine
how likely it is that the match call in a particular case is erroneous.
E. Is NOT ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADVERSARIAL CASEWORK TESTING
PROOF ENOUGH THAT THE RISK OF ERROR IN FINGERPRINT
EXAMINATION Is EXTRAORDINARILY Low?
No. The fact that fingerprint evidence has long been admitted in
courtrooms is insufficient reason to conclude that fingerprint evidence
must have an extremely low error rate. Adversarial testing bears no
relation to the type of scientific testing that can yield information about
error rates . 6 Cross-examination, presentation of opposing experts, and
other tools of the adversarial method cannot reveal rates of error
because there is no ground truth available against which to compare
examiners' conclusions7 That is, in order to know if an examiner's
conclusion is correct, we would need to know what the truth was (e.g., is
that really the defendant's fingerprint?) as given by reliable information
other than that provided by the examiner. Because truth in any particular
24. The same could be said about the false negative error rate statistic.
25. Lempert, supra note 15, at 449 ("[Tlhe implications of... [the false positive] error rate for the
likelihood that a particular reported match is erroneous depend[] on the proportion of true matches in
the cases the laboratory analyzes.").
26. Some courts understand this point. State v. Rose, No. Ko6-o545, at 24. 28 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct.
19, 2007) (order granting motion to exclude testimony) ("The State is correct that fingerprint evidence
has been used in criminal cases for almost a century. While that fact is worthy of consideration, it does
not prove reliability.... An error rate, or lack thereof, must be demonstrated by reliable scientific
studies, not by assumption."). Other courts do not. See e.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d
848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (noting that "the error rate with latent print identification is vanishingly small
when it is subject to fair adversarial testing and challenge").
27. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 72 n.68 (2002)
("[Riarely is it possible to test whether an examiner in a real case is correct or incorrect."); Simon A.
Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and
Back Again, 41 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1211 (2004) ("[I]n real life cases, no one knows the truth.
Other actors in casework-detectives, attorneys, judges, juries-are not so much testing the fingerprint
examiner's conclusions as following them."); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation
of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 96 (20O8) ("Ground truth is
unknown during adversarial proceedings, so the outcome cannot be used to assess validity of the
method being used.").
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case is rarely known, the best we can do is estimate the rate at which
examiners commit errors in similar situations. Such estimates can only be
obtained by subjecting examiners to controlled scientific testing.
The lack of ground truth, in combination with a presumptive belief
in the accuracy of fingerprint evidence, stacks the deck against finding
fingerprint errors when they are made. Sometimes highly credible and
probative information comes to light that provides assurance that the
,8fingerprint examiner's judgment was right or wrong. But those cases are
the exception. Most often, there is no independent proof of the accuracy
of an examiner's call. Consequently, the absence of large numbers of
known errors in fingerprint cases says little about the accuracy of
fingerprint match declarations."
F. DOES THE TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF THE FINGERPRINT EXAMINER
PROVIDE AN APPROPRIATE BASIS ON WHICH TO ASSESS THE RISK OF
ERROR IN A GIVEN CASE?
No. Whereas an examiner's training and experience are relevant for
assessing his expert qualifications, they tell us little about the risk of
error. Expertise does not guarantee reliability or translate into a low risk
of error. Studies in psychology show that people with the extensive
experience and training commit enormous judgment errors and, in some
instances, make worse decisions than those with less experience and
training." In some forensic sciences, experienced analysts do not commit
fewer errors than inexperienced analysts or even, on some tasks,
laypeople.3 I The point is that training and experience alone are
28. Cole, supra note 27, at 1211 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine what evidence would possibly
convince any criminal justice system actor, including the defendant's own counsel, that the fingerprint
evidence was erroneous."); Interview by Adrian Cho with Simon Cole, NEW SCIENTIST, June 16, 2001,
at 42 ("Remember a trial is not an experiment because you have no way of validating your results. If
you falsely match a fingerprint, then the guy is convicted and goes to jail. Who's going to believe he's
really innocent unless there's some extraordinary circumstance, like DNA comes along or someone
else confesses? There's no way you would ever know.").
29. Michael J. Saks et al., Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. lO69, 1102 n.I69 (1998) ("The allusion to
'thousands of cases without error' begs the question of validity. In actual disputed cases it rarely, if




. Ellen J. Langer & Lois G. Imber, When Practice Makes Imperfect: Debilitating Effects of
Overlearning, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2014, 2014 (979); see also Earl H. McKinney & Kevin
J. Davis, Effects of Deliberate Practice on Crisis Performance, 45 HUM. FACTORS 436, 444 (2003).
31. Moshe Kam et al., Signature Authentication by Forensic Document Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC
Scis. 884, 887 (2ooI) (noting that expert document examiners and laymen each detected amateur
forgeries more than 9o% of the time); Jodi Sita et al., Forensic Handwriting Examiners' Expertise for
Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 1I17, 1121 (2oo2) (finding that expert document examiners
correctly detected skilled forgeries 55% of the time; laymen detected the forgeries 57% of the time).
But see Moshe Kam & Erwei Lin, Writer Identification Using Hand-Printed and Non-Hand-Printed
Questioned Documents, 48 J. FORENSIC SciS. 1391, 1391 (2oo3) (finding that expert document
examiners made fewer errors than laymen on hand-printed and non-hand-printed documents).
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insufficient criteria on which to base the risk of error.
G. DOES NOT INTRODUCTION OF AN ERROR RATE PLACE AN UNFAIR
BURDEN ON FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE?
Some people have argued that requiring error rates for fingerprint
examiners and other forensic scientists is unfair because we don't require
error rates for other types of evidence such as eyewitness testimony,
evidence of motive, or business records.32 So why can't we trust juries to
apply their collective common sense and experience to fingerprint
evidence, much as they apply their judgment to other types of evidence?
The reason is that common sense and experience do not prepare fact
finders to assess the reliability of a fingerprint expert's judgment. Two
reportedly matching prints do not necessarily share a common source
just because an expert says so. Yet there is a real risk that this is exactly
what jurors will assume after they hear an expert who purportedly has
specialized knowledge testify to a ioo% certain match.
Common sense and experience do prepare jurors to assess the
significance of a finding that a defendant's fingerprint is found on a
drinking glass at the scene of a crime. But before they reach this
inferential step, jurors must understand that there is uncertainty
regarding the identification of the defendant's fingerprint in the first
place. Unlike empirically derived error rate estimates, common sense
does not illuminate this source of uncertainty.
H. Is IT NOT INAPPROPRIATE TO USE GENERAL, INDUSTRYWIDE EXAMINER
ERROR RATES TO ESTIMATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS BY A SPECIFIC
EXAMINER IN A SPECIFIC CASE?
This argument has intuitive appeal. After all, no one in his right
mind would assume that all examiners, in all laboratories, working on
different cases have identical chances of making a false identification
when those examiners have different skill levels, use different subjective
matching criteria, and are working with different sets of prints. So
doesn't it follow that industrywide examiner error rates are inapplicable
to case-specific examiner error rates? No.
No one has ever argued that the unique features associated with a
particular forensic science laboratory, examiner, or case should be
ignored when these features are demonstrably related to a reduced error
rate. But the mere existence of such unique features does not deny
relevance to reliably produced industrywide error-rate estimates.
Instead, the industrywide error-rate estimates provide anchors for
32. Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science and Policy, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. io8i, Io88 (1997) ("We regularly admit other kinds of evidence, such as business
records, without any thought of quantifying the error that undoubtedly attends their creation.").
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judgments about the risks of error in individual cases. This is an
elementary and critical point: if the industrywide false positive error rate
is 20% for technique A and 2% for technique B, then the risk of this type
of error in any given case is generally higher when technique A is used
rather than technique B.33
Wait, you say. What if the examiner in the target case is unusually
proficient when using technique A and there is solid evidence to support
this contention? Why should he be tagged with a 20% error rate when, in
all probability, his error rate is lower? The answer is that he should not
be tagged with the 20% error rate as a final estimate. Instead, the 20%
industrywide estimate should be adjusted downward in light of this, and
all other information?' But, as a rule, the 20% industrywide estimate
associated with technique A should serve as the starting point for any
specific adjustments, just as the 2% estimate serves as the starting point
for any adjustments associated with technique B.
Having said this, one must be careful not to presume that
industrywide error rate estimates should be adjusted downward in most
cases simply because some favorable case-specific features exist (e.g.,
unusually talented examiner). If the industrywide error rate estimate is
produced reliably, then the frequency and magnitude of downward and
upward error rate adjustments across all cases should be about the same.
Thus, just as a decision maker should adjust a general error rate
downward when the examiner is unusually talented, he should adjust it
upward when the latent print is unusually faint. All factors should be
considered and adjustments should be made around the estimated
industrywide error rate.35
33. FAIGMAN, supra note 27, at 74 ("It should matter to a factfinder whether the error rate of an
identification technique is a fraction of a percent or 20 percent, even if the court regards neither level
of error sufficient to exclude the expert testimony.").
34. Those who contend that a 20% industry-wide error rate should be ignored when some
examiner-specific information is not accounted for in the industry-wide rate are committing a logical
error called the base rate fallacy. The base rate ordinarily remains relevant even in the face of
additional individuating information. A more sophisticated challenge to the base rate argument in this
context occurs when there is credible information about the specific cause of testing errors (or the
absence of testing errors) that either no longer exists or has changed significantly. If, for example, a
disproportionate number of proficiency-test errors were committed by those who had less than one
year of experience, but new rules forbid testimony from such relatively inexperienced analysts, then
the error rate should be recomputed using the narrower examiner reference class (i.e., examiners who
have at least one year of experience). That is, rather than rely on the error rate for all examiners, a
more appropriate error rate would be the subset of examiners who have at least one year of
experience (subject to sample size concerns). Paul E. Meehl & A. Rosen, Antecedent Probability and
the Efficiency of Psychometric Signs, Patterns, or Cutting Scores, 52 PsycH. BULL. 194, 194 (1955). This
point is less an indictment of the use of error rates than it is a reminder that error rates based on
narrower reference classes are preferable to those based on broad reference classes when both are
available. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Normative, Descriptive and
Methodological Challenges, i9 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCIS. I, to (1996).
35. Koehler, supra note 4, at 874 ("It cannot be that every laboratory in the industry has an error
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I. Is THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN ERROR RATE AND A
METHODOLOGICAL ERROR RATE?
No. In a misguided effort to salvage the strange and misleading
"zero error rate" claim, some in the forensic science community have
suggested that there are two broad classes of errors: those that arise due
to method and those that arise due to the humans who employ those
methods. 6 According to this view, the method never has and never will
err. When mistakes occur, they are due to incompetent and/or poorly
trained people.37
But as Simon Cole has pointed out: "There is no methodology
without a practitioner, any more than there is automobile without a
driver, and claiming to have an error rate without the practitioner is akin
to calculating the crash rate of an automobile, provided it is not driven." '
When this issue of automobile crash rates arises, drivers and cars are part
and parcel of the automobiles that occasionally crash. Likewise,
fingerprint examiners and the observation methods they use are
"inextricably linked" to the fingerprint examination process.39 Indeed,
where a method depends as heavily on subjective human judgment as
does fingerprint examination,' the method literally is the people who
employ it.
To summarize, there are many different types of errors and error
rates. Knowledge of error rates is necessary to assess the probative value
rate that is less than the industry-wide average. Yet this is exactly the claim that is made every time
laboratory personnel reject the industry-wide figures, and argue that their own error rate is
substantially less or zero.").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Havvard, 1t7 F. Supp. 2d, 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000) ("The
government claims the error rate for the method is zero. The claim is breathtaking, but it is qualified
by the reasonable concession that an individual examiner can of course make an error in a particular
case.").
37. Id.; Joint Appendix at 168, United States v. Rogers, No. CR-9o-i-BR (E.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2000)
("[Ilt's the government's position, with respect to fingerprints, there's no rate of error. One, [sic] the
fingerprints match. There's no rate of error. It's a matter of separating the methodology from the
practitioner. The method is foolproof. If there's a mistake it's with the practitioner and that goes to the
qualifications of the witness."); see also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in
Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1034-37 (2005) (criticizing the
concept of methodological error rate).
38. Cole, supra note 37, at lO39.
39. David A. Stoney, Fingerprint Identification: Scientific Status, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 82, 103 (Faigman et al. eds., 2002) ("[C]urrent
fingerprint examination processes are inextricably linked with the human examiner and one cannot
separate the human error of the examiner (whatever the cause) from the reliability of fingerprint
evidence.").
40. See, e.g., IAN W. EvEIT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS
FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 240 (1998) (noting that "the undisputed subjectivity of a fingerprint
comparison"); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" is
Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 638 n.185 (2002) ("Latent fingerprint examiners make subjective
judgment calls throughout the entire comparison process .... "); Stoney, supra note 39, at 99. ("The
criteria for absolute identification in fingerprint work are subjective and ill-defined.").
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of a reported fingerprint match, but this inference is not an easy one.
Some might be tempted to eschew error rates in favor of such
unscientific arguments as "we would know by now if errors were a
problem," "error rates don't apply to individual cases," or "the
fingerprint method is infallible." These arguments should be rejected. A
better approach is to focus on understanding what error rates are and
how to obtain the best possible error rate estimates. The following
section on proficiency tests addresses this issue.
II. PROFICIENCY TESTS
A proficiency test is an assessment of the performance of laboratory
personnel using samples whose sources are known to the proficiency test
administrator but unknown to the examinee. Such tests can serve many
purposes including but not limited to training and testing personnel,
improving laboratory practices and procedures, and identifying future
needs for a laboratory. Properly designed, proficiency tests may also
provide a reasonable estimate of the rate at which false discoveries, false
positive errors, and false negative errors occur.4" My comments below
focus on the value of proficiency tests as an indicator of error rates.
A. How ARE PROFICIENCY TESTS CURRENTLY CONDUCTED?
Collaborative Testing Services (CTS) offers hundreds of laboratories
the opportunity to participate in two fingerprint proficiency tests each
year.4" Test participation is voluntary, examinees know that they are
participating in a test, and it is not clear whether examinees work by
themselves, in groups, or with assistance from supervisors.43 A 2007 test
in which 351 response sheets were returned to CTS is typical.' In this
test, participants received photographs of eleven latent prints from an
alleged crime scene, four sets of known finger and palm imprints, and a
short scenario that described a bank robbery. 5 Nine of the eleven latents
matched some of the known prints, two did not.46 Examiners were not
told whether any of the knowns produced any of the latents. Once they
reached their conclusions, examinees filled out a results form, mailed the
41. Ronald G. Nichols, Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark
Identification Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 586, 592 (2007)
("[P]roficiency tests can offer to the court a reliable practical indicator of how often the profession,
using accepted procedures, practices, and controls, makes a false identification.").
42. See Forensics Program-Collaborative Testing Services, Inc., http://www.collaborative
testing.com/forensics/index.html (last visited Apr. 20, 20o8). CrS is the primary provider of external
forensic science proficiency tests across a variety of subfields, including fingerprint examination.
43. Id.
44. COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS.. INC.. FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM: LATENT PRINTS SUMMARY
REPORT TEST No. 07-516 (2007) [hereinafter CTS TEST No. 07-516], available at http://www.
collaborativetesting.com/reports/27 I6_web.pdf.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 3.
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data to CTS, and CTS published the performance report (laboratories
and examinees were anonymous)."7
B. Do EXISTING PROFICIENCY TESTS TELL Us ANYTHING ABOUT THE
POSSIBILITY OF ERROR AND THE RATES WITH WHICH ERRORS ARE
LIKELY TO OCCUR IN CASEWORK?
Yes and no. Existing proficiency tests provide some information
about the risk of error, though they fall far short of offering convincing
scientific proof of the rates at which errors occur. 8 Consider, once again,
the 2007 CTS fingerprint proficiency test. The test materials included two
latent prints that were produced by people whose known prints were not
provided.49 However, four examiners (i.i%) incorrectly matched one of
the latent prints to one of the knowns; three examiners matched a latent
to an innocent suspect; a fourth examiner matched a latent to an
innocent bank employee."
This test demonstrates that some examiners are likely to commit
false positive errors on occasion. But this does not mean we can trust
CTS tests to identify the rates with which errors occur. First, there is the
baserate problem noted in question D above. Second, the CTS tests tend
to be conducted under unreasonable test conditions (e.g., non-blind
conditions that use relatively easy materials).5 ' This means that the error
rates on existing proficiency tests are probably lower than those
encountered in ordinary casework.52 One might think of these error rates
47. See id. at 19-20.
48. Cole, supra note 37, at 1033 ("The existing data are inadequate to calculate a meaningful
error rate for forensic fingerprint identification."); Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Error Rates
for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 339, 339
(Nalini K. Ratha & Ruud Bolle, eds., 2004) ("It is impossible to determine from existing data whether
true error rates are miniscule or substantial."); William A. Tobin & William C. Thompson, Evaluating
and Challenging Forensic Identification Evidence, CHAMPION, July 2006, at 12, 19-20 ("[Pjroficiency
testing in forensic science is frequently worthless as a true indicator of examiner proficiency.").
49. CTS TEST No. 07-516, supra note 44, at 2.
50. Id.
51. This is a frequent criticism of DNA proficiency tests. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("Llera Plaza II") (containing testimony from fingerprint expert
Allen Bayle who claimed that the FBI's fingerprint proficiency tests are easier than casework because
they contain too many matching prints and because the test prints had greater than usual clarity);
Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Account for Error (Even When a National
Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 JURIMETRICS 425, 429-30 (1997) ("[B]ecause most
proficiency tests are relatively easy in the sense that they are nonblind, internal tests that use large,
clean stains, performance on these tests would appear to provide a generously low estimate of
(criminal) casework error rates.").
52. Lempert, supra note 15, at 447 (noting that existing proficiency tests "can be expected to
understate error rates, for laboratory technicians can take special care when they know they are
dealing with test samples"); Adina Schwartz, A Systematic Challenge to the Reliability and
Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. REV. 2, 27 (2005) (noting
that CTS proficiency tests "are likely to have understated day-to-day laboratory rates because the
testing was declared, rather than blind"). But see Steve Gutowski, A Response to: A Systematic
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as the lower boundary for actual casework error rates.53
C. CAN PROFICIENCY TESTS BE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE REASONABLE
ESTIMATES FOR THE RATES AT WHICH EXAMINERS COMMIT ERRORS IN
CASEWORK?
Yes. The key lies in the planning and execution of the tests. From a
planning standpoint, careful thought must be given to issues of print
difficulty and the frequency with which available known prints are the
source of the sample latents. The participants should be representative of
examiners who testify in court." Further, the courts should weigh in to
ensure participation. 5 From an execution standpoint, disinterested
administrators should oversee the testing process. The tests should be
double blind in the sense that neither the examinees nor examinees'
supervisors should be aware that the materials being analyzed are part of
Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, a Recently
Published Article by Adina Schwartz, FORENSIC BULL., Winter 2005, at 22, 24 ("[Proficiency tests
probably overestimate the error rate due to the irritation many examiners felt, at least in the past, of
unnecessary testing which stopped people from getting on with their 'real work,' in addition to a
tendency or misunderstanding that external tests were not supposed to undergo the usual technical
and administrative reviews.") (emphasis added).
53. When fingerprint proficiency tests are more difficult-as they were in a test provided by CTS
in 1995 which include a latent print from the identical twin of one of the knowns-the number of false
identifications can increase dramatically. In this test, 33 out of 15o reporting laboratories (22%) made
at least one misidentification on the seven samples. Twenty-nine labs made exactly one
misidentification, two labs made two misidentifications, and two labs made six misidentifications.
COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC., FORENSIC TESTING PROGRAM, LATENT PRINTS EXAMINATION,
REPORT No. 9508 (1995). As a former editor of the Journal of Forensic Identification noted, "reaction
to the results of the CTS 1995 Latent Print Proficiency Test within the forensic science community has
ranged from shock to disbelief." David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
521, 524 (t996). Subsequent tests have been less difficult in that they rarely include latents and knowns
from such highly related individuals. Importantly, the absence of a clear metric by which to gauge print
difficulty is a problem in its own right. Haber & Haber, supra note 27, at 95 ("[T]he profession lacks a
quantitative measure of print quality (difficulty). One expert observed that the prints used in the FBI
proficiency test are so easy they are a joke." (citation omitted)).
54. Ideally, the participants should be a random sample of this population.
55. Because the forensic science community is unlikely to embrace and voluntarily participate in
tough, realistic proficiency tests, the courts might require such participation from laboratories that wish
to offer results in a trial. This point arose in the context of DNA evidence as well. See Erin Murphy,
The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence,
95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 796 (2007) (arguing that laboratory error rate data would have to be provided "if
reliability were treated as a threshold question of admissibility"); Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert,
15 CARDozo L. REV. 1959, 1997 (1994) ("Unfortunately, forensic laboratories have historically resisted
external blind proficiency testing and other efforts to assess laboratory error rates.... Unless there are
strong decisions on the error rate issue, forensic DNA laboratories and legislators will not voluntarily
do what Daubert requires." (footnote omitted)). For a different view, see Berger, supra note 32, at
IO88 (arguing that it is "pointless" to argue that reliable error rates should be admitted because error
rates for individual laboratories are "unattainable"), and Edward J. Imwinkelried & D. H. Kaye, DNA
Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 460 (arguing that the admissibility
"standards relate to the capacity of an analytical procedure to generate accurate results when properly
applied," not to whether the individual using those procedures is prone to err).
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a proficiency test.56 The following section provides a simple blueprint for
the production and administration of proficiency tests that are designed
to identify the rates at which errors occur under various conditions.
III. PROFICIENCY TEST DESIGN FOR MEASURING ERROR RATES
As noted above, proficiency tests serve a variety of goals. One of
those goals-and the central issue in this Article-is the identification of
reasonable first pass estimates for error rates in case work under a
variety of conditions. 7 This goal cannot be attained under the existing
approach to proficiency testing. Instead, a variety of factors related to the
production of samples, selection of participants, and administration of
the test need to be sharpened before the public can trust that the error
rates identified on proficiency tests offer reasonable first-pass estimates
for the rate at which fingerprint examiners err in actual cases."
A. WHAT FEATURES SHOULD THE SAMPLE PRINTS HAVE?
The latent prints used in proficiency tests should approximate a
random sample of the type of latents found in legal cases. This may be
accomplished in different ways. One way is for test administrators to
access a database of all cases in a county, state, country, or other
population over some time period (e.g., five years), and to note which of
these cases included latent prints. A random sample of those cases might
then be identified as prototypes for proficiency test samples. The random
sample is likely to include samples and cases that vary widely. One case
might include two detailed latents, and rolled prints from one suspect
and two innocents. Another case might include a single, smudged latent
and rolled prints from ten suspects, including a pair of siblings. Once a
random sample of fingerprint cases has been identified, proficiency test
administrators should write comparable cases and produce sets of latent
prints that resemble those in the sample. Materials should not be reused
across tests. The newly created latent prints should be rated for
56. The highest quality proficiency testing is "double-blind" administered by an outside agency.
In ideal double-blind testing, the test taker and test taker's supervisor(s) should not be aware that the
sample(s) under analysis is a proficiency test. Anything less than double-blind testing administered by
an outside agency significantly erodes the effectiveness and value of a proficiency test. Tobin &
Thompson, supra note 48, at 2I n.25.
57. See S.D. Ferrara et al., Proficiency Testing for Psychoactive Substances in Italy, I13 INT'L J.
LEGAL MED. 50, 52 (1999) (reporting false positive and false negative error rates from a large
proficiency testing program for the analysis of substances in urine).
58. See Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Letter to the Editor, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENIFICATION
493, 496 (2OO6) (arguing that fingerprint error rate studies should adopt "conditions representative of
case work," including varying the difficulty of latents, using latents in which the majority do not match
known prints, and using representative examiners).
59. Proficiency test administrators commonly reuse materials in different tests. This is a poor idea
because examiners sometimes recognize the materials and because it limits testing materials.
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difficulty using an agreed-upon rating scheme" to ensure that they
parallel the sample of selected cases and to allow researchers to track the
impact of latent difficulty on accuracy. Likewise, administrators should
track task features such as whether some latents are from common
sources or not, and whether rolled prints that match latents are or are not
present. Proficiency tests that are created in this (or a similar) manner
should increase public and judicial confidence that test materials reflect
those that occur in actual case work.
B. SHOULD THE PROFICIENCY TESTS BE BLIND OR OPEN?
Proficiency tests should be double blind. This means that neither the
examiners nor any party that has a direct interest in how the examiners
perform should be aware that the proficiency test materials are part of a
test rather than part of actual casework. 6' The reason for this precaution
is that examiners' performance is likely to improve when they know they
are being tested." Presumably, knowledge that one is being tested makes
examiners more vigilant than they are when performing casework.63
Proficiency tests, like ordinary casework, should also be conducted
under conditions of contextual blindness. That is, examiners should not
be exposed to anything more than a few essential facts of the target case
that are required to complete their examination. They should not be told
anything about the beliefs of law enforcement, prosecutors, or other
personnel, nor should they know the type or strength of other evidence
in the case. Research demonstrates that match reports issued by
fingerprint examiners are influenced by contextual factors, including
what they believe others think of the evidence.64 Contextual blindness is
required to ensure that examiners base their conclusions on the forensic
science evidence alone.
Blind proficiency testing is used in some forensic science areas65 and
6o. Development of a print-difficulty rating scheme will require some empirical testing. See
Haber & Haber, supra note 27 (calling for an experimentally validated quantitative metric of latent
print difficulty).
61. In open proficiency testing, examiners know they are being tested. Joseph L. Peterson et al.,
The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing. L Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC
ScIs. 21, 26 (2003).
62. Id.
63. Id. (stating open proficiency tests sometimes receive "special treatment").
64. Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCL INT'L 74, 76 (2oo6); Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts
Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION. 6oo, 61o (2oo6); see also D. Michael Risinger et al., The
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation
and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REv. I, 35-38 (2002).
65. Peterson et al., supra note 61 ("Currently, some proficiency testing programs, such as the
Department of Defense's proficiency testing program for forensic urine drug testing [reference
omitted] and HIV testing, are blind."); Steven Rand et al., The GEDNAP (German DNA Profiling
Group) Blind Trial Concept, t16 INT'L J. LEGAL MED. 199, 201 (2002) (reporting results from DNA
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has broad support in the academic community."' Moreover, a detailed
pilot investigation with DNA analysts showed that blind testing can be
done."6
C. WHO SHOULD ADMINISTER THE PROFICIENCY TESTS?
The administrators should be qualified, disinterested parties. By
"qualified" I mean people who have expertise across a broad range of
subject matters including experimental design, testing, statistics,
behavioral sciences, forensic science, and police investigation. If cost is a
major concern, then cost control specialists should also be consulted. By
"disinterested" I mean that proficiency test administrators should not be
affiliated with the examinees or the examinees' laboratories, nor should
they stand to benefit from any particular outcome or set of outcomes on
the proficiency tests.
D. WHO SHOULD TAKE THE PROFICIENCY TESTS?
Proficiency test participants should be a random or otherwise
representative sample of laboratories and examiners drawn from the
population of those who provide fingerprint testimony in court. 68 If we
are to obtain reliable data on the accuracy of fingerprint examination,
participation should not be a matter of choice.69 As part of the tests,
participants should provide pertinent background information (e.g.,
training, experience, number of cases, etc.). The policies I recommend
blind trials across 129 laboratories in twenty-eight European countries).
66. Peterson et al., supra note 6i, ("[B]lind proficiency testing.., provides a more realistic test of
lab performance" than open proficiency testing.); Lempert, supra note 15 , at 447 ("The obvious way to
estimate laboratory error rates is through blind proficiency testing."); Risinger et al., supra note 64, at
45 ("The simplest, most powerful, and most useful procedure to protect against the distorting effects of
unstated assumptions, collateral information, and improper expectations and motivations is blind
testing."); cf. Alfred Biasotti & John Murdock, The Scientific Basis of Firearms and Toolmark
Identification, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 495, 510
(Faigman et al., eds., 2002) ("It is clear that in such a high stakes game, laboratory administration will
do everything possible to ensure that the proficiency tests results are correct before reporting them.").
67. Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA Proficiency Testing. II.
Experience with Actual Blind Tests, 48 J. FORENSIC SCIs. 32, 39 (2003). One examiner was tipped off to
the proficiency test by a friendly administrator. Id. at 38. This problem is less likely to arise when the
administrators are disinterested parties.
68. Ideally, a large set of proficiency data would be collected from every examiner who wishes to
testify in court. However, as others have noted in the context of DNA evidence, this would require an
impractical amount of testing. JOSEPH L. PETERSON & R.E. GAENSSLEN, DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR
MODEL EXTERNAL DNA PROFICIENCY TESTING 109 (20OI), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesi/
nij/grants/i92282.pdf ("At this stage, though, it is highly unlikely that declared or blind proficiency
tests can be administered with sufficient frequency, relative to the quantity of most laboratories'
caseloads, to allow a meaningful calculation of the lab's or any examiner's 'error rate."').
69. Peterson et al., supra note 61, at 23 ("In fact, it has been demonstrated that mandated
proficiency testing enhances overall quality of clinical laboratory testing, including turnaround time,
accuracy of results, and training of laboratories, whereas self regulation has been found less effective
in achieving those goals.").
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here represent a significant change from current practices where
proficiency test participation is voluntary and little is known about the
characteristics of test-taking examiners. If the sampling of examiners is
done properly, the resultant performance data may be generalized to the
broader population of fingerprint examiners.' Furthermore, by tracking
examiner characteristics, we will gain insight into the conditions under
which performance varies."
E. How SHOULD THE RESULTS BE SCORED?
After noting the key features of the sample prints and test situation72
four important rates should be computed: (i) the false positive error
rate, (2) the false negative error rate, (3) the false discovery rate, and (4)
the inconclusive rate. To avoid an illusion of precision, 95% confidence
intervals around those error rate estimates should be presented in
reports and explained at trial.73
It will be a challenge to convey the significance of the different error
rates to jurors. Previous research indicates that people struggle to
understand the significance of probabilistic forensic science evidence,
including the experts themselves.74 Further research is needed to identify
how best to convey the probative value of fingerprint examination to
jurors in light of the reported error rates.
70. Writing in the context of proficiency tests for firearms and toolmark examiners, Professor
Adina Schwartz argues that "proficiency testing can (at most) establish an error rate for the particular
people tested, not for firearms and toolmark examination as a whole." Schwartz, supra note 52, at 25.
Professor Schwartz is right if her comment is interpreted in the context of current proficiency test
practices: if those who take proficiency tests are not representative of the forensic science population,
then we cannot be confident that the resultant error rates are valid estimates for the whole industry.
However, if participants are randomly sampled, a statistically sound extrapolation can be made.
71. Although the initial studies with well-constructed proficiency tests are likely to produce error
rate data that are broadly applicable, the research should not and will not end there. Ultimately, the
goal is to understand the conditions under which the risk of error is more and less likely and by how
much. Characteristics of the examiner, prints, crime, and technology, are some of the variables that
may matter. See FAIGMAN, supra note 27, at 63 n.7 ("Since such errors can occur and have occurred, the
questions move on to: what are the probabilities of such errors under varying conditions."); Lawson,
supra note 3, at 44 ("Two critical questions must, however, be tested: I) what is the probability of an
erroneous match, and 2) under what circumstances are errors more likely or less likely to occur. These
questions have not been asked of fingerprint identification evidence and the lack of knowledge of the
real answers to these questions is what makes the conclusions drawn from fingerprint analysis suspect
and arguably unreliable." (citations omitted)).
72. See supra Part III.A.
73. Some scholars recommend using the upper bound of the error rate's 95% confidence interval
as an estimate of the error rate rather than the estimated error rate itself. Lempert, supra note 15, at
453.
74. See generally Koehler, supra, note 4.
75. The National Research Council made a similar call for behavioral research to understand how
best to convey the significance of a DNA match. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC
SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 203 (1996).
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F. Is NOT THIS TYPE OF PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM Too EXPENSIVE?
No. Professor Joseph Peterson and his colleagues provided a series
of estimates for the cost of a double-blind proficiency test program for
forensic DNA laboratories.76 They assumed participation from 150
laboratories per year, two tests per year, a 20% fringe benefits rate, and a
ten-person oversight committee. The cost estimates ranged from
$814,000 to $3,020,000. 77
Cost estimates associated with a similar program for fingerprint
examination would almost surely be lower than those for DNA due to
differences in the technologies and sample preparation protocols.
Moreover, because many of the testing costs are fixed (a consideration
not taken into account in the Peterson et al. DNA estimates), future
program costs will likely decrease. A fingerprint proficiency testing pilot
study would be useful to help pin down cost estimates for a broader
program. But in light of how much is at stake and where there is broad
agreement that existing tests are inadequate, it does not appear that a
double-blind national proficiency testing program for fingerprint
examination is impossible to conduct or too expensive to maintain.
Once we have accumulated a body of proficiency test data that meet
the criteria described above, the scientific integrity of the forensic
sciences will improve and the resultant error rate data should take on
much greater significance in the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
The reliability and probative value of a reported fingerprint match is
inextricably linked to the rate at which fingerprint examiners make
errors.7s For this reason, it is important that legal decision makers have
valid information about the risks of false identification and false
nonidentification. Examiners' pseudo-scientific claims of absolute
certainty79 must no longer fool us into thinking that the risk of error is
negligible or nonexistent.
In discussing errors, error rates, and the design of proficiency tests
that can assist with error rate estimates, I considered-and rejected-a
variety of skeptical arguments. For example, I reject the claim that
information about the training and experience of an examiner provides
sufficient information about risk of error. I reject the claim that
industrywide error rates obtained from well-constructed proficiency tests
76. Peterson et al., supra note 61, at 28-29.
77. An estimate extrapolated from the authors' project was at the low end, an estimate from a
government agency test provider was at the high end, and an estimate from a commercial test provider
fell between the other two estimates but was closer to the lower end ($1,o5o,ooo). Id. at 29 tbl.3.
78. See generally Thompson, supra note 15.
79. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, 8.
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are irrelevant to estimates of the risk of error in specific cases. I reject the
claim that it is too difficult, expensive, or time consuming to implement a
mandatory program of double-blind proficiency tests administered by
disinterested parties.
And yet there is a kernel of truth in each of the rejected claims. An
examiner's training and experience is relevant to an assessment of the
risk of error. Other things being equal, a poorly trained examiner
probably is at higher risk of making a false identification than a well-
trained examiner. Likewise, a set of industrywide error rates cannot tell
us everything we wish to know about the risk of error in a specific case.
Testimony about contamination problems in a particular laboratory or
about the faintness of certain markings on a latent print may reasonably
inform a juror's subjective estimate of the chance of error in a particular
case. And surely the rigorous proficiency testing system that I envision
will require significant effort and will run into a variety of snags when it
is implemented across the nation.
But there is no contradiction between all of these rather obvious
concessions and the viewpoint put forward in this Article. Though the
idealized goal may be identification of the unique risk of error that
attends each and every case, insistence on achievement of this goal prior
to embracing a methodologically rigorous testing program belies a
misunderstanding of the purpose and value of scientific measurement.
Consider one of the most celebrated medical studies in modern
history, the Physicians' Health Study."' This randomized, double-blind"'
study found that people who took a daily dose of aspirin had a 44%
reduction in the risk of myocardial infarction relative to those who did
not take aspirin. The study was widely hailed as important, well-designed
and a model for future medical studies.8' Thousands of physicians have
recommended a daily aspirin regime to millions of patients and, as a
result, many lives have been saved. Yet it would not be hard for a critic
to poke gaping holes in this celebrated study. Consider the participants.
They were hardly a random sample of the general population: they were
male physicians over the age of forty who were in excellent health.83
Consider the lack of oversight in the administration of the daily
medication. Some participants may have skipped doses or taken some
other unreported medications on their own. Or consider that the study
8o. Steering Comm. of the Physicians' Health Study Research Group, Final Report on the Aspirin
Component of the Ongoing Physicians' Health Study, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 129 (1989).
8i. Neither the participants nor the investigators knew whether a participant was in the
experimental or placebo group. Group assignment was random.
82. See generally Videotape: Against All Odds: Inside Statistics, Program 12: Experimental
Design (The Consortium for Mathematics and its Applications and Chedd-Angier 1989), available at
http:llwww.learner.orglresourceslseries65.html.
83. Steering Comm. of the Physicians' Health Study Research Group, supra note 8o, at 129.
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provided no insight into dose effects: all participants in the experimental
group took one 325 milligram tablet every other day.8' A skeptic could
point to one or more of the study's imperfections and draw the mistaken
inference that the study is irrelevant to the risk of myocardial infarction
of any particular person. Such an inference would be an instance of what
might be called the "imperfection fallacy" (i.e., a tendency to treat
imperfect information as irrelevant).
Why do I mention this study and the imperfection fallacy here?
Because a person who is motivated to dismiss test results-including
those from a well-designed proficiency test-can always do so by
embracing the test's inevitable imperfections. All proficiency tests will
exclude some features that are relevant for assessing the risk of error in a
particular case. Despite these imperfections, a well-designed test should
still serve as an initial best estimate for the risk of error in a particular
case. This case-specific risk can and should be adjusted if case-specific
particulars that are not captured by the proficiency test data indicate that
such adjustment is appropriate. But the anchor data provided by a
properly designed proficiency test should not be discarded by any
person, agency, scientific body, or court on account of an imperfect
mapping of particulars any more than the results of the Physicians'
Health Study should be discarded by those who are not male physicians
in excellent health.
In closing, I note that one of the great ironies of the forensic science
community's resistance to scientific testing to identify error rates is that
identification of those rates may not reduce the perceived probative
value of reported fingerprint matches. At present, jurors hear little about
error rates, though some may be aware of cases in which examiners
erred. If credible data show that all relevant error rates are miniscule,
jurors may treat the data as evidence that bolsters the credibility of the
reported match." Although such data would force examiners to
acknowledge the risk of error,86 it might also go a long way toward
improving the actual and perceived scientific status of fingerprint
examination.
84. Id.
85. Jason Schklar & Shari Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies,
23 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 159, 159 (1999).
86. Another way to impress upon jurors that examiner testimony is opinion rather than fact is to
require an instruction from the bench to this effect. Utah v. Quintana, 103 P.3d i68, 170, 171 n.3 (Utah
Ct. App. 2004) (Thorne, J., concurring) ("[T]rial courts should be directed to instruct juries about the
existing weaknesses of fingerprint examiner training and identification protocol.... [T]he jury should
have been specifically instructed that the examiner's testimony was opinion and not fact and that the
jurors should examine the fingerprint evidence independently. It is vital that we remove the near
mystical awe that fingerprints evoke, and replace it with a more cautious regard for forensic evidence
and its overall lack of certainty."); FAIGMAN, supra note 27, at 65 (suggesting that one solution to the
problem of insufficient data to back fingerprint identification claims is a "judicial instruction of the
jury about the limitations of the field"). The sufficiency of such judicial instruction is unknown.
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